How STPA will propel safety analysis beyond its failure-bound paradigm.
This white paper offers a practical approach to building a more robust safety capability. Discover how to propel safety analysis beyond its failure-bound paradigm by harmonising the top-down systemic insights of System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) with the bottom-up quantitative verification of Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA).
Traditional safety analysis techniques, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), were designed around component failures. However, as industrial systems become increasingly interconnected, software-intensive, and autonomous, dangerous accidents can occur even when every individual component functions as intended. This white paper by Airbus Protect explores System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)—a modern safety analysis technique based on systems theory rather than reliability theory.
What you will find
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Limitations of Traditional Safety Methods: An examination of why conventional reliability-based tools fail to capture unsafe interactions in complex, software-driven systems.
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Fundamentals of STPA: An introduction to system-theoretic concepts, control loops, and how safety constraints are enforced across complex architectures.
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Identifying Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs): Methodologies for uncovering hazardous control behaviors, flaws in system feedback, and software logic oversights.
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Integration into Engineering Lifecycles: Practical guidance on implementing STPA early in system design to mitigate risks proactively and streamline safety compliance.
Authors
Julien Vidalie
MBSA Engineer
Max Chopart
System Safety Engineer